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Abstract
The concepts of ‘real rape’ and ‘real rape victim’ play a key role in
the reporting and prosecution of rape cases and strongly influence their outcomes.
Similar biases and misconceptions obscure other acts of gender-based violence such
as forced marriage in times of armed conflict. This paper analyses how the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and
the International Criminal Court construct and reconstruct the concepts of a ‘real’
and ‘simple forced marriage’. It argues that the difference lies in the elements of con-
sent, coercion, duration and purpose. The paper highlights the gendered everyday
realities in which myths surrounding conflict-related forced marriage are embedded
and then taken for granted and accepted as normal, contributing to the denial,
downplay or justification of acts of violence against women. It argues that by reinforc-
ing these concepts, courts miss an opportunity to educate the legal community and
the public about women’s experiences in peace and wartime and to develop a definition
of the crime of forced marriage that reflects women’s realities.
1. Introduction
The concepts of ‘real rape’ and ‘real rape victim’ play a key
role in the reporting and prosecution of rape cases and strongly influence their
outcomes.1 Encompassed within these concepts is the idea that ‘real rape’ is
perpetrated in a surprise attack at night in a public, deserted place by a male
stranger who uses physical violence against a young, respectable, white, female
victim who resists but is overpowered and sustains multiple injuries. ‘Simple
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rape’, in contrast, occurs within the private sphere and is perpetrated by a man
known to the victim who shows no obvious signs of resistance or violence.2 The
pervasiveness of these concepts in and outside of the criminal justice system
results in the disqualification of, and underreporting by, women who do not
consider themselves ‘real victims’ and their experiences ‘real rape’.3 It shifts
the focus from the acts of the perpetrator to those of the survivor who is treated
with suspicion and a lack of sensitivity, faced with victim blaming attitudes and
subjected to intrusive questioning about their state of mind based on their ac-
tions and inactions.4 This leads to a majority of rapes being disregarded as the
grave harm, injury to personal integrity and act of aggression that they are.5
Similar biases and misconceptions exist in relation to other acts of gender-
based violence, forced marriage in times of armed conflict being one of them.
Stories of women in Sierra Leone and Uganda invoke images of conflicts where
male fighters abduct women and girls, take them to their camp, label them a
fighter’s wife and subsequently subject them to various acts of physical, sexual
and psychological violence, including rape, forced pregnancy, forced labour,
corporal punishment and enslavement.6 Similarly, stories of Malian women
call attention to the highly coercive environment of cities under armed occupa-
tion that pervert traditional marriage practices.7 Stories of women and men in
Cambodia highlight the brutality and all-encompassing ideological rigidity of
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the Khmer Rouge regime that married strangers in mass ceremonies and forced
them to consummate their marriage and procreate as a step in their socialist
revolution and creation of a new society.8 Their stories become stories of ‘real
forced marriage’.
Comparatively, stories of Cambodian men and women who consented to
marriage,9 of Malian women who were temporarily married to members of
Ansar Eddine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb with the apparent consent
of their families to allow sexual intercourse,10 of Malian and Sierra Leonean
women who arguably married, or were married off, for survival, protection and
access to resources,11 and of Sierra Leonean women who were forced into mar-
riage with fighters of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) or the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and stayed with their forced husband without
attempting to escape12 become stories of ‘simple forced marriage’.
This article analyses how the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) construct and reconstruct the concepts of a conflict-
related ‘real’ and ‘simple forced marriage’. It highlights the gendered everyday
realities in which those concepts are embedded and then taken for granted and
accepted as normal, contributing to the denial, downplay or justification of acts
of violence against women.13 By reinforcing these concepts, the courts miss an
opportunity to educate the legal community and the public about women’s ex-
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periences in peace and wartime and to develop adequate definitions of crimes
that reflect women’s realities.14
2. The Cases
Since the SCSL took up its work in 2002,15 international and
hybrid courts have addressed forced marriage in the context of different conflicts
and have categorised, defined and understood the crime in different ways.
The SCSL dealt with cases of forced marriage committed by the AFRC and
RUF during the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002. Members of
fighting groups abducted or captured civilian women and girls, forced them
into unlawful marriages to fighters and subsequently subjected them to various
acts of gender-based psychological, physical and sexual violence.16 In an attempt
to explain the perpetration of conflict-related forced marriages in Sierra Leone,
they are compared to peacetime conventions of marriage by capture that are
pushed into the context of conflict. However, a more nuanced understanding
would consider the lack of material wealth of fighting groups. In this context,
forced wives are used as a low-cost payment system and seen as remuneration
for fighters’ bravery. The number of forced wives then also becomes a status
symbol with higher ranking fighters being assigned, or allowed to choose, more
wives than fighters of lower rank. In addition to indicating a fighter’s social
status, forced marriage also indicates his status as an adult man by providing
an opportunity to fulfil a masculine ideal of marriage, parenthood and being
the provider for, and protector of, wives and children. Forced wives, in turn,
become an inherent part of a fighting group’s organisational structure and are
coerced into participating in direct combat, performing domestic work and
acting as wives to their forced husbands and as mothers to the children born
into forced marriages. This indicates that their presence in fighting groups is
of vital importance for the creation of bonds and dependency structures that
are intended to advance the creation of a new social order, increase unit cohesion
and stability, and reduce the likelihood of escape in an already extremely coercive
environment. Contrary to this, forced marriage also strategically serves the
Andrias (n 1).14
The Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone and the SCSL Public Archives <http://www.rsc-
sl.org/> accessed 15 April 2020.
15
Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Trial Judgment)
SCSL-04-16-T ‘AFRC Case’ (20 June 2007) para 701ff; Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima
16
Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Appeals Chamber Judgment) SCSL SLS-2004-16-A
‘AFRC Case’ (22 February 2008) para 175ff; RUF, ‘Trial Judgment’ (n 11) paras 1291ff, 1460ff;
Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial Judgment) SCSL-03-01-T (18 May 2012) paras 418-421; The
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone and the SCSL Public Archives (n 15).
Journal of Human Trafficking, Enslavement and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 2020-128
BAUMEISTER
military objective of demoralising and disabling the opponent by dissolving
social bonds in families and communities.17
In addition to the SCSL, the ECCC addressed forced marriages that were
perpetrated as part of a nationwide policy during the 1975-1979 reign of the
Khmer Rouge. Here, the regime held mass ceremonies in which it forced men
and women into lawful marriages. Often the spouses were strangers who were
matched based on their similar backgrounds and married without advance notice
or a way to refuse. They were then pressured to consummate the marriage and
to have children. In Cambodia, forced marriages were part of the ruling party’s
socio-economic programme to reconstruct the country and its society as part
of a socialist revolution. Forced marriages were a means to control sexual rela-
tions between men and women with the goal to rapidly increase the population
of ‘desirable citizens’ through births in an attempt to socially engineer the future
population through forced procreation.18
Thirdly, the ICC currently deals with forced marriages perpetrated during
the armed conflicts in Uganda since 2002 and Mali in 2012/13 in the cases
against Dominic Ongwen19 and Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag
Mahmoud 20 respectively. In regard to forced marriage, the situation in Uganda
is similar to that in Sierra Leone. A fighting group, the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA), abducts or captures civilian women and girls, forces them into marriage
with fighters and subjects them to acts of sexualised violence and forced labour.
This is done to control a person’s sexuality, to reward fighters and to demonstrate
and increase their status in the group, to keep the fighting group operational,
to demoralise and disable the opponent, and to create bonds within the fighting
group and a new social order in the wider society.21
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In Mali, the city of Timbuktu was seized and fell under the control of Ansar
Eddine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In this context, women were
forced into marriage through intimidation by armed men who used threats and
physical violence if the victim or her parents refused their propositions and offers
of money. Once married, women were subjected to acts of sexualised violence
and in some cases raped repeatedly by several men in fighters’ camps before
they were swiftly divorced again. Some women also had to perform domestic
tasks. In Mali, forced marriages were used as a means to gain and exercise
control over the local population and their land. Like in Sierra Leone and
Uganda, forced marriage was a way to form ties between members of the
fighting group and the local population, to reward fighters and to allow sexual
intercourse between members of the armed groups and local women and girls
to create a new society.22
3. Real Simple
In AFRC, RUF, Case 002, Ongwen and Al Hassan, the SCSL,
ECCC and the ICC discussed the difference between forced and traditional
marriages in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Uganda and Mali. They also considered
apparent benefits such as protection, socio-economic support and payments of
money forced wives or their families received from forced husbands or through
the marriage. Those relative benefits prompted some forced wives to stay with
their forced husband sometimes even after the conflict had ended and deterred
them from attempting to escape, something that was further discouraged
through intimidation and threats of physical punishment and death. Through
discussions of the differences between forced and traditional marriages, relative
benefits and possibilities of escape, the courts examined the state of mind of
the survivor rather than the actions of the perpetrators, indirectly asking if
forced wives or their families consented to the forced marriage. An element of
consent would mark a forced marriage as a ‘simple’ rather than ‘real forced
marriage’. However, the courts also recognised that coercive circumstances
vitiate consent, making a forced marriage a ‘real forced marriage’. Taking into
account pre-existing as well as purposively created coercive environments re-
turned the focus to the words and conduct of perpetrators. However, courts
neglected wider historic, socio-political, and economic circumstances and their
impact on interpersonal relationships in fighting groups. In addition to consent
‘Recognition of and Intervention in Forced Marriage as a Form of Violence and Abuse’ (2012)
13 Trauma, Violence and Abuse 176; Kramer (n 6).
Al Hassan, ‘Rectificatif à la décision relative à la confirmation des charges portées’ (n 10) para
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and coercion, the SCSL, ECCC and ICC indicated that the nature of a forced
marriage determines if a forced marriage is a ‘real’ or a ‘simple forced marriage’.
Temporarily limited unions that were formed predominantly for sexual purposes,
for example, are seen as ‘simple’ rather than ‘real forced marriages’ because
they were never meant to be a lifelong sacrosanct union23 of two people that
creates mutual obligations.24
The following part of the article elaborates on these points. It argues that
the courts’ construction of conflict-related ‘real’ and ‘simple forced marriages’
is based on biases and misconceptions that are embedded in taken-for-granted
gendered everyday realities that contribute to the denial, downplay or justification
of acts of violence against women. They have to be taken into consideration
when developing a definition of the crime of forced marriage for the purpose
of International Criminal Law to prevent patriarchal stereotypes from being
enshrined in law and to ensure an appropriate reflection of survivors’ experi-
ences.
3.1. Traditions as Proxies for Consent
In the AFRC25 case, the SCSL considered the differences
between traditional and early marriages on the one hand and conflict-related
forced marriage on the other in an effort to understand the context, socio-cul-
tural meaning and long-term consequences of forced marriages formed during
the conflict in Sierra Leone. In doing so, they intended to highlight differences
between acts they considered criminal and those locally accepted as normal.
Based on the expert testimony of Zainab Bangura, the court stressed the impor-
tance of familial consent and marriage ceremonies in customary marriages and
the absence of both in conflict-related forced marriages.
In Case 002, the ECCC distinguished traditional and forced marriages in
Cambodia. It highlighted that traditional marriages were arranged by the
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spouses’ parents with the consent or acquiescence of the bride and groom. They
included a payment of a dowry and a wedding ceremony marked by communal
and religious elements. In forced marriages, the Khmer Rouge regime took the
place of the parents and authorised marriages of men and women who were
matched based on age, class, status, location and ethnicity. Here, collective
consent took priority over familial and individual consent. Couples were married
in mass ceremonies in which spouses would ‘make a resolution announcing
their biographies and their loyalty to one another’26 as well as to the regime.
Once married, members of the regime forced or coerced them to consummate
their marriage and procreate. While spouses lived separated, they were pressured
to meet regularly for reproductive purposes. They could not refuse to marry or
to consummate the marriage for fear of violence and death and they did not
have the right to divorce.27
The ICC discussed the difference between traditional and conflict-related
forced marriages in Ongwen and Al Hassan. In the case against Dominic Ong-
wen, the Prosecutor highlighted the difference between traditional and conflict-
related forced marriages in Uganda. She emphasised rites of courtship, the
payment of a dowry and social benefits resulting from traditional marriages,
and the absence of these elements in conflict-related forced marriages.28
In the case against Al Hassan, the ICC began to explore the difference
between traditional Malian marriages, temporary marriages recognised under
Islamic law and forced marriage as allegedly perpetrated by members of Ansar
Eddine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb during the armed conflict in
Timbuktu. Similar to traditional marriages in Sierra Leone, the court stressed
that traditional forms of marriage in Mali are marked by individual or familial
consent, the offer or payment of a dowry and the performance of a marriage
ceremony.29 In temporary marriages, the spouses are married for a limited
period of time, sometimes with an exchange of money, with an easy way to di-
vorce.30 Conflict-related forced marriages in Mali were temporary marriages
that involved a payment of a sum of money. Therefore, they included elements
of traditional and temporary marriages. However, the ICC Prosecutor described
SAO Sarun Interview Record as quoted in Case 002, ‘Trial Judgment’ (n 9) para 3567.26
Case 002, ‘Trial Judgment’ (n 9) paras 265-273, 3522ff.27
Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen (Public Redacted Version of ‘Prosecution Closing Brief’) ICC-
02/04-01/15 (24 February 2020) paras 162, 172.
28
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29
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forced marriage in Mali as ‘inherently coercive’31 as they were formed through
intimidation and the use of physical violence in the context of an armed conflict
by members of feared, armed and violent groups without the option to refuse.32
In these cases, the courts indirectly raised questions about the lawfulness
of the marriages and the state of mind of survivors and their families. If conflict-
related forced marriages would be comparable to traditional marriages that are
in accordance with domestic or customary law, they might not amount to ‘real
forced marriages’. However, according to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II in
Ongwen, the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a marriage is not an element of the
crime of forced marriage.33 This is supported by the findings of the SCSL34 and
the ECCC35 as they determined that unlawful forced marriages in Sierra Leone
as well as lawful forced marriages in Cambodia amounted to ‘real forced mar-
riages’. As mentioned above, in Sierra Leone, members of fighting groups
captured or abducted women and group leaders subsequently assigned them
as wives to particular fighters. This indicates that conflict-related forced mar-
riages disregarded domestic and customary laws that emphasised a period of
courtship, individual or familial consent, the payment of a dowry and the
holding of a marriage ceremony. Consequently, they were unlawful. Independent
of this, the SCSL found that members of the AFRC as well as the RUF perpe-
trated ‘real forced marriages’.36 In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge regime de-
veloped a government policy on marriage that underlined the importance of
the family as the basis for the development of a new society in accord with the
ideology of its socialist revolution. The implementation of this policy meant a
clear departure from traditional marriages based on children’s respect for their
parents and religious beliefs and a move towards the subordination of the indi-
vidual and familial to the collective that took a parental position and authorised,
organised and monitored marriages. This policy was enforced, including by
violent means, throughout Cambodia and the spouses and their families viewed
these conflict-related forced marriages as fully valid. Nevertheless, the ECCC
determined that they amounted to ‘real forced marriages’.37
Al Hassan, ‘Prosecution’s Final Written Observations Regarding Confirmation of the Charges’
(n 11) para 163.
31
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32
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While the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a conflict-related forced marriage
does not appear to influence its classification as a ‘simple’ or ‘real forced mar-
riage’, consent makes a difference and situations where victims or their families
consented to the marriage might not be understood as ‘real forced marriages’.
In contrasting forced and traditional marriages in Sierra Leone38 and Cam-
bodia39 as well as forced and temporary marriages in Mali,40 the SCSL, ECCC
and ICC emphasised and privileged familial over individual consent. Con-
sequently, a marriage with the consent of the bride’s family but without the
assent of the bride herself would be a ‘simple’ rather than a ‘real forced marriage’
as the element of familial consent is met and individual consent is optional.41
Here, the courts moved away from a liberal and Western individualistic notion
of consent as enshrined for example in Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights42 and began to recognise the existence and validity of some
alternative types of consent.43 However, by prioritising familial over individual
consent, they built on and perpetuated the erasure of peacetime violations of
women’s right to consent to marriage and assumed a benign nature of commu-
nities.44
In Ongwen, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II took a different approach to con-
sent and stressed that the ‘central element of forced marriage is the imposition
of “marriage” on the victim, i.e. the imposition, regardless of the will of the victim,
of duties that are associated with marriage, as well as of a social status of the
perpetrator’s “wife”’ (emphasis added).45 By emphasising ‘the will of the vic-
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tim’,46 the court focused on individual consent to marriage. In doing so, it
suggested that a conflict-related forced marriage is a ‘real forced marriage’ if it
is formed against the bride’s will.
By extension, a forced marriage would also be a ‘real forced marriage’ if the
victim is considered legally incapable of giving genuine consent to the marriage,
for example because of their age.47 Furthermore, minors exemplify ‘real victims’
who are young, vulnerable, helpless and in need of protection, making it more
likely that their experiences of forced marriage are classified as ‘real forced
marriages’.48 As demonstrated above, a focus on familial consent evades the
classification of an early marriage as a ‘real forced marriage’ as the spouses’
individual consent, or their inability to give genuine consent, is superseded by
the consent of their families. The SCSL touched upon questions related to the
minimum age for marriage especially in the AFRC case. However, these were
subsumed under the more general distinction between traditional and conflict-
related forced marriages in Sierra Leone and not explored further.49
At trial stage in the AFRC case50 as well as in the case against Charles
Taylor,51 the court circumvented questions related to consent to marriage alto-
gether by establishing conflict-related forced marriage as a form of the jus cogens
crimes of sexual slavery and conjugal enslavement respectively.52 In addition
to situating forced marriage in the context of historical and modern slavery and
the struggle for its abolition and decolonialisation that highlights the seriousness
ibid.46
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of the conduct, legally and socially, both categorisations signal a lack of consent.53
Consequently, the state of mind of the survivor does not need to be examined
and the investigatory focus is placed on the actions of the perpetrator. Moreover,
under this label, the question of whether or not a conflict-related forced marriage
is a ‘real’ or ‘simple forced marriage’ does not arise as the conduct is not seen
as forced marriage in the first place and as a form of slavery or enslavement
instead. Despite these advantages of categorising conflict-related forced marriage
as a form of slavery or enslavement and despite forced marriages meeting the
necessary element of perpetrators exercising powers attaching to the right of
ownership over victims,54 this categorisation does not fully address the unique
and complex experiences of forced spouses, ‘the harms and abuses suffered
and the conditions or terms in which the harms occurred’.55 Women were en-
slaved for purposes of forced marriage, including forced labour and impregna-
tion. In the same vein, the victims were not only subjected to repeated sexual
abuses in conditions in which they were deprived of their freedom, they suffered
additional injuries such as stigmatisation and ostracisation arising from being
labelled ‘wives’ and made to engage in duties associated with marriage.56
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To summarise, an element of consent shaped the SCSL’s, ECCC’s and ICC’s
understanding of a conflict-related forced marriage as a ‘real’ or ‘simple forced
marriage’ albeit in different ways depending on the approach to consent. If a
focus is placed on familial consent to marriage, the absence thereof is a marker
of a ‘real forced marriage’. In a ‘simple forced marriage’, in contrast, the indi-
vidual spouses are married against their will but with the consent of their
families. However, if the courts emphasise individual consent, a ‘real forced
marriage’ is marked by the lack of consent of the individual spouses. This in-
cludes situations where one or both spouses are deemed incapable of giving
genuine consent. To determine individual or familial consent, the courts have
to confirm the survivor’s state of mind. This unduly moves the focus of the in-
quiry away from the words and conduct of the perpetrator and the context in
which they acted and places an emphasis on the actions or inactions of the
victim. Often inappropriate, punitive questioning during investigations and at
trial contributes to secondary victimisation of those the police, lawyers and
courts set out to protect. Only patriarchal stereotypes of, and attitudes to, women
remain safe and guarded.57
3.2. Benefits as Proxies for Consent
Continuing in this line, in the AFRC58 as well as the RUF
case,59 the court also deliberated whether, despite being abducted, forced into
marriage and coerced to perform sexual and other services for their forced
husbands and the fighting group, forced wives benefitted from the forced
marriage because they received protection, food and access to looted goods and
consequently might not have attempted to escape and in some cases stayed
with their forced husband even after the conflict had ended.
The Defence teams in RUF60 and Al Hassan61 appeared to suggest that the
relative benefits forced wives or their families received from their forced husband
in the form of protection and access to resources during their forced marriage
or as a payment of a sum of money at the outset signified their consent to the
marriage. Furthermore, by accepting those alleged benefits, forced wives argu-
ably demonstrated tactical agency under coercive circumstances. Consequently,
they are not seen as ‘real victims’.62 As demonstrated above, consent of ‘simple
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victims’ who act strategically to improve their situation would lead to the classi-
fication of these forced marriages as ‘simple’ rather than ‘real forced marriages’.
In the RUF case, the SCSL considered situations where women were forced
into marriage and subsequently gained access to resources and protection from
their forced husband. Some forced wives also stayed with their forced husband
after the conflict had ended, often out of socio-economic necessity.63 The Defence
appeared to suggest that an initially forced marriage can become consensual
through even a coerced exchange of goods and services that arguably could take
on the form of mutual conjugal obligations in the form of loyalty and the provi-
sion of sexual, reproductive, domestic and support services of the wife in ex-
change for the protection and provision of material resources by the husband.64
As demonstrated above, an element of consent, possibly even reluctant agree-
ment or survival consent given under highly coercive circumstances, transforms
a conflict-related forced marriage from a ‘real’ into a ‘simple forced marriage’.
Importantly however, following this interpretation would reverse the under-
standing that coercive circumstances make genuine consent impossible.65 It
would also dispute the court’s previous determination in the AFRC case. Here,
the SCSL found that any reluctant agreement given or any benefit received
during the forced marriage does not vitiate the criminal nature of the initial
action of forcing a person into marriage.66 Following this, situations where
forced wives receive a relative benefit from their forced husband or through
their forced marriage are still categorised as a ‘real forced marriage’. Similarly,
the court also stated that forced wives holding positions of respect, wives of
commanders and Mammy Queens for example, does not detract from having
been coerced into a ‘real forced marriage’.67 The ICC’s decision on questions
of consent and culpability in the case against Dominic Ongwen might prove
illuminating in this debate. Ongwen was abducted and made a child soldier
and was therefore initially forced into the LRA. Eventually, however, he became
a commander of the group and allegedly chose to participate in their criminal
AFRC, ‘Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave’ (n 25); RUF, ‘Trial Transcript’ (n 11); RUF,
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actions68 possibly because he was socialised into the LRA and became a victim
of circumstances.69 His participation might also have been a strategic choice
and a means of survival.70 However, Ongwen’s continued active participation
in the LRA and his rise in their ranks might also have been motivated by feelings
of loyalty towards the group, a shared ideology and a wish to gain power, status
and influence.71 Depending on the court’s decision on questions of mental ca-
pacity and duress, Ongwen might be held responsible for his actions and the
initial violation of his rights might be superseded by his later wilful participation
in the LRA. Following this line of argument without intending to equate the
experience of Dominic Ongwen with that of forced wives, women who are ini-
tially forced into a marriage and subsequently gain a relative benefit from, and
therefore might be said to have consented to and wilfully participated in, the
union might not be seen as ‘real victims’ and their experiences not categorised
as ‘real forced marriages’, as the Defence in the RUF case suggests.
Additionally, the ICC might refer to the AFRC or RUF case and the SCSL’s
considerations of forced marriage with relative benefits in its deliberations in
Al Hassan. Here, conflict-related forced temporary marriages in Mali included
a payment of a sum of money to the bride or her family.72 Accepting the pay-
ment, albeit under coercion, could be interpreted as individual or familial con-
sent to the marriage. Again, this would lead to its categorisation as a ‘simple’
rather than ‘real forced marriage’. However, compared to conflict-related forced
marriages in Sierra Leone, consent would have been given at the beginning of
the marriage rather than later in its course. Taking this into account, a conser-
vative reading by the court might not recognise acts of violence perpetrated
within the marriage as crimes. However, taking into consideration the ECCC’s
finding that rape in the context of forced marriage amounts to another inhumane
Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen (Public Redacted Version of ‘Corrected Version of “Defence
Closing Brief”, filed on 24 February 2020’) ICC-02/04-01/15 (13 March 2020) paras 11-21;
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act,73 it is unlikely that the ICC would go back on the progress that has been
made, for example, regarding the concept of continuous consent and the
criminalisation of marital rape. However, it might follow the SCSL in Taylor74
and separate an ‘interrelated whole conduct’75 into the initial act of forcing or
coercing a person into a conjugal association without their consent on the one
hand, and the acts of gendered physical, sexual and psychological violence
perpetrated within that union on the other. This would not fully capture surviv-
ors’ experiences and the nature of forced marriage as a process and a ‘larger
overarching [gendered] harm associated with [this] particular collection of
[sexual and non-sexual] offences (…) that other international criminal law terms
[such as sexual slavery or enslavement] do not adequately or fully capture.’76 As
the Prosecution in the AFRC case stressed:
Sexual slavery does not necessarily amount to forced marriage, in that a
sexual slave is not necessarily obliged to pretend that she is the wife of the
perpetrator. Similarly, a victim of sexual violence is not necessarily obliged to
perform all the tasks attached to a marriage.77
The label ‘marriage’ attached to this coerced, involuntary relationship marked
by gender-based violence can manipulate forced spouses into loyalty towards
each other or create a feeling of commitment between them. It can result in
mutual obligations and long-term socio-economic dependency that extend
beyond the end of the conflict. This is further influenced by traditional gender
and family norms that prescribe women’s subordination and a collective lifestyle
that discourages single motherhood. Moreover, it is affected by the social stig-
matisation that portrays survivors of forced marriage as willing collaborators.78
This indicates that a forced marriage is more than the sum of its parts. The to-
tality makes it a distinct crime that cannot be adequately captured by existing
categories of international crimes or in a collection of separate charges.79 Con-
sequently, if the ICC in Al Hassan follows the SCSL’s determination in Taylor,
it would not fully address the crime of conflict-related forced marriage and its
consequences. However, the Prosecutor in Al Hassan appeared to aim for a
more just outcome when she stressed that the harm and stigmatisation that
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forced wives experience is different from, and in addition to, that resulting from
sexual violence.80 While a separate crime of forced marriage would do important
work to address the injustices forced spouses have experienced in the past,
categorising it as a form of slavery or enslavement to highlight the absence of
consent of victims might work towards changing social perceptions of the
conduct and consequently survivors’ experiences in the future, serving the
broader women’s rights agenda.81 However, the same could be achieved by
developing a fuller, less patriarchal understanding of forced marriage as the
conflict-related gender-based violation of a person’s autonomy that it is.
Developing the previous conclusion further, a conflict-related forced marriage
is a ‘simple’ rather than a ‘real forced marriage’ if an element of consent is met,
be it familial or individual consent, possibly even if given once under coercive
circumstances and in exchange for a relative material or immaterial benefit.
3.3. A Lack of Resistance as Consent
In addition to questions about individual and familial consent
raised by inquiries into the differences between traditional and conflict-related
forced marriages and relative benefits victims receive through a forced marriage,
an apparent lack of resistance could be interpreted as consent.82 Consequently,
courts might interpret a conflict-related forced marriage as a ‘simple’ rather
than a ‘real forced marriage’ if a forced wife did not attempt to escape and
misplace the focus of the inquiry on the actions or inactions of the survivor
rather than the words and conduct of the perpetrator. However, the SCSL, ECCC
and ICC all emphasised the futility of escape as victims had nowhere to go and
risked severe physical punishment and even death if they were caught.83 Simi-
larly, the courts stressed that victims were severely punished for refusing to get
married or to consummate the marriage, for breaking the rules and disobedi-
ence.84 This demonstrates that a lack of resistance, including attempts to escape,
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does not indicate consent of the victims to the marriage. Rather, it highlights
that forced wives and forced husbands lived in highly coercive environments
that deprived them of their liberty and autonomy. In addition to the absence of
consent, it is those coercive circumstances that make a conflict-related forced
marriage a ‘real forced marriage’.
3.4. A Coercive Environment
As discussed above, the AFRC and RUF cases before the SCSL,
Case 002 before the ECCC and the Al Hassan and Ongwen cases before the ICC
suggest that an element of consent makes a conflict-related forced marriage a
‘simple’ rather than a ‘real forced marriage’. They also stress that coercive cir-
cumstances vitiate consent.85 Therefore, the existence of a coercive environment
marks a conflict-related forced marriage as a ‘real forced marriage’. Placing a
focus on coercive circumstances surrounding a forced marriage has the potential
to prevent an undue focus on the actions or inactions of the survivors and avoid
inappropriate questioning and secondary victimisation. This highlights the
importance of analysing the contextual dimension, the everyday constraints as
well as the broader surrounding circumstances of a marriage. Crucially, this
analysis has to go beyond an application of concepts like freedom and voluntar-
iness that would return the focus to the survivor’s state of mind, relative gains
and escape routes. It is crucial to apply a broad understanding of coercive cir-
cumstances that cannot be reduced to a list of examples. An analysis of coercive
circumstances must consider pre-existing as well as purposively created formal
and informal power disparities that have a compelling effect on the victim and
make the threat and use of force unnecessary. It also has to take into account
the victim’s perception of the perpetrator’s power and how this impacts their
ability to consent. Therefore, a broad understanding of coercive environments
and circumstances better reflects the nature and impact of the acts of the per-
petrator and has the potential to direct attention to their actions rather than
those of the victim. The key question then becomes whether the victim could
exercise their free choice and the perpetrator’s awareness of and role in it.86
This in turn would inform a better understanding of who a ‘real victim’ of a
‘real forced marriage’ is.
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The SCSL, ECCC and ICC demonstrated a relatively broad understanding
of coercion and acknowledged that it includes pre-existing as well as purposively
created physical and non-physical elements. They recognised that a person can
be coerced into a conflict-related forced marriage and into performing conjugal
duties, for example, through threats and the use of physical or sexual violence
against the victim or a third person, abduction, detention, enslavement, intim-
idation, duress, psychological oppression, the abuse of power and taking advan-
tage of a coercive (conflict) environment.87 Building on this, the courts’ defini-
tions of the crime of forced marriage moved towards the inclusion of a general
element of coercion rather than a list of examples.88 They recognised that ‘forced
marriage describes a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or
conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a
person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner’.89
This definition indicates that, in the cases discussed above, the courts arguably
took a perpetrator-centric approach90 to the assessment of coercive circumstances
by focusing on the actions of the accused and of those under their command,
stressing that actual and perceived power disparities between victims and per-
petrators made the threat and use of direct force unnecessary and impacted
victims’ ability to act autonomously. However, the courts did not consider the
wider coercive context of a world shaped by deep, intersecting inequalities, cir-
cumventing discussions about race, class and sexuality, amongst others.91 Ar-
guably with the exception of Case 002, this led to, amongst others, a disregard
of the fact that men as well as women live in coercive environments. Therefore,
neither women nor men are free agents with a full capacity for action in this
context. However, men have relative agency compared to women. Consequently,
some men willingly participate in conflict-related forced marriages and freely
AFRC, ‘Trial Judgment’ (n 16) paras 114, 233, 694, 720, 734, 745, 1078, 1081, 1093, 1184; AFRC,
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Ongwen, ‘Victims’ Closing Brief’ (n 71) para 101; Ongwen, ‘Prosecution Closing Brief’ (n 28)
paras 111, 118-119, 160-164.
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select wives or have wives selected for them.92 Some approach or pressure their
superiors to give them a wife and can negotiate the choice of a wife.93 Some
men, however, strategically marry, for example to protect themselves and dispel
rumours of actual or imagined adultery or impotence. Yet others are ordered
to marry.94 However, again with the exception of the ECCC, the courts did not
question forced husbands’ consent to marriage or the lack thereof and feminised
conflict-related forced marriage. This indicates that they maintain a gendered
victim-perpetrator dichotomy that is built on ideas of absolute freedoms. This
again obscures the wider coercive circumstances and their impact on individuals
and prevents consent and responsibility from being seen in a dynamic, active
and relational sense.95
3.5. Duration and Purpose
In addition to coercion and consent, the duration and purpose
of a conflict-related forced marriage impact its classification as a ‘real’ or ‘simple
forced marriage’.
In Al Hassan, the temporary nature of forced marriages and their strategic
and sexual purpose marks them as ‘simple forced marriages’96 as they were
never meant to be sacrosanct unions97 of two people that create lifelong mutual
conjugal obligations.98 However, this interpretation would ignore the long-
lasting stigmatisation that ex-forced wives experience as a consequence of even
temporary forced marriages that were intended as a reward for fighters, a way
for them to satisfy their sexual needs, to procreate and build a new society.99
Mirroring the above-mentioned judicial interpretation of a relative benefit as a
sign of consent, community members accused ex-forced wives of marrying
members of Ansar Eddine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb for financial
gain, impacting their ability to consensually marry and start a family in the fu-
ture.100 This demonstrates that, comparable to forced marriages in Sierra Leone,
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Uganda and Cambodia,101 even temporary forced marriages do not simply end
when a couple divorces or separates but have complex, long-lasting con-
sequences.
The ICC’s discussions about the purpose of a conflict-related forced marriage
in Al Hassan could be guided by the SCSL’s deliberations in the AFRC case102
and the submissions of the Defence in Ongwen.103 Both suggest that a conflict-
related forced marriage primarily for the purpose of sex is not a ‘real forced
marriage’ and possibly not a ‘simple forced marriage’ either but rather a form
of sexual slavery. In the AFRC case, the SCSL Trial Chamber found that even
though at first glance there was evidence that a forced marriage also consists
of non-sexual elements, it was ‘not satisfied that the evidence adduced by the
Prosecution was capable of establishing [these] elements (…) of “forced marriage”
independent of the crime of sexual slavery’.104 Building on this, the Defence in
Ongwen understood forced marriage and forced labour involving compulsory
sexual activity to be encompassed by the crime of sexual slavery.105 However,
considering Justice Doherty’s partly dissenting opinion in the AFRC case,106
the RUF case107 and the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II on the confirmation
of charges in Ongwen,108 exclusivity, at least for the forced wife, would render
the forced marriage ‘not predominantly a sexual crime’109 and therefore a ‘real
forced marriage’. Here, the fact that, in Sierra Leone and Uganda, forced hus-
bands often had more than one wife and therefore forced marriages not being
exclusive unions on their part, while arguably still not being predominantly
sexual, does not appear to impact their classification as ‘real forced marriages’.110
Acknowledging the gendered sexual and non-sexual elements of conflict-related
forced marriage as the basis for establishing it as an independent crime is crucial
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to counter myths that women primarily experience conflicts as victims of
sexual violence when they are targeted because of their broader gender roles
that make them not only sexual beings but (domestic) workers and caretakers
as well.111 Importantly, this has to be done without enshrining patriarchal stereo-
types into law. Arguable, the label of slavery or enslavement would achieve this
and additionally avoid the use of the language and acceptance of the perspective
of the perpetrators that legitimises the conduct, serving the wider women’s
rights agenda. However, it might also mask elements of sex and gender com-
pletely.112
4. Conclusion
This article discussed the SCSL’s, ECCC’s and ICC’s construc-
tion and reconstruction of the concepts of a ‘real’ and ‘simple forced marriage’.
An analysis of the AFRC, RUF, Case 002, Ongwen and Al Hassan cases suggests
that indicators of a ‘simple forced marriage’ are:
– familial or individual consent, possibly even if given once, reluctantly,
under coercive circumstances and in exchange for a relative material or
immaterial benefit;
– a lack of resistance;
– temporariness;
– a predominantly sexual purpose.
Contrastingly, markers of a ‘real forced marriage’ are:
– pre-existing and/or purposively created physical and non-physical coercion;
– a lack of consent;
– exclusivity of the forced wife;
– a sexual and non-sexual purpose.
The courts’ discussions of ‘real’ and ‘simple forced marriages’ generally
indicate a focus on the words and conduct of the perpetrator. However, they
built on and perpetuated biases and misconceptions related to the benign nature
of tradition and familial consent, and the optionality of individual consent. This
denies women agency and constructs them as passive victims. However, the
courts allowed inquiries into survivors’ lack of resistance and acceptance of re-
lative benefits, tactically interpreting both as possible signs of agency and con-
sequently consent. This in turn indicates an expectation that women have to,
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and will, fight a violation of their rights, ignoring that they might also freeze
or flop under highly coercive circumstances.113 However, in neither situation
does a lack of resistance amount to consent, nor does a relative gain excuse or
justify the violation. As is indicated here, the courts maintained a clear and
gendered victim-perpetrator dichotomy. In doing so, they neglected ideas of
relational autonomy and personhood and wider coercive contexts that are shaped
by deep and intersecting inequalities, complicating victim and perpetrator
constructs. Drawing on the same gendered notions, the courts built on and
perpetuated understandings of marriage as an exclusive, lifelong sacrosanct
union between a man and a woman and took a traditional view on their respec-
tive conjugal duties. This incorporates patriarchal gender stereotypes into ‘jur-
isprudence that (…) seeks to make gains for women’114 and disregards alternative
forms of marriage and conjugal duties.
These biases and misconceptions highlight elements that have to be taken
into consideration when developing a definition of forced marriage for the
purpose of International Criminal Law. A definition must recognise that forced
marriage is a process rather than an act. As such, forced marriage includes
both, coercing a person into a conjugal association without their consent as
well as various acts of gendered physical, sexual and psychological violence that
are perpetrated within that relationship. The element of consent has to be un-
derstood broadly to allow for a context sensitive interpretation and application.
Similarly, the element of coercion must be interpreted to cover the wider coercive
circumstances that continuously surround a forced marriage in addition to pre-
existing and purposively created physical and non-physical coercion. In this
context, women and men have to be recognised as subjects and objects of forced
marriage, as both victims and perpetrators. Following on from this and taking
into account the different forms of forced marriage in different contexts, the
acts of gendered physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated within
a forced marriage have to be interpreted flexibly.
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